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By GIAMPAOLO GARZARELLI* and RICCARDO FONTANELLA**
ABSTRACT. This work shows that the modular organization of volun-
tary open source software (OSS) production, whereby programmers
supply effort of their accord, capitalizes more on division than on
specialization of labor. This is so because voluntary OSS production is
characterized by an organizational learning process that dominates the
individual one. Organizational learning reveals production choices
that would otherwise remain unknown, thereby increasing productiv-
ity and indirectly reinforcing incentives to undertake collective
problem solving.
Introduction
With success stories such as Apache, Linux, and Mozilla, open source
software (OSS) has entered into the vocabularies of millions of indi-
viduals worldwide. The increasing number of OSS users1 has stimu-
lated a vast and growing interest on the economics, and more
generally social science, research front.2 What seems to puzzle most of
this research is that, contrary to more familiar economic theory, the
development method of OSS should not have accounted for its
success. How can a number of individuals dispersed around the world
who mostly rely on open standards and an ethos of code sharing lead
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to a stable production process? Thus OSS production is perceived to
be at odds with many traditional production paradigms (Feller and
Fitzgerald 2002). This is especially the case for OSS development that
is voluntary in nature.
Voluntary OSS development—the principal interest of this
article—is in fact a production process whereby individuals supply
input of their own accord. That is to say that it is a process where there
is mostly self-selection in—rather than direction of—task performed
(Langlois and Garzarelli 2008). By letting individuals contribute effort
according to their own volition, voluntary OSS development tries to
profit from the “distributed intelligence” of members of virtual com-
munities (Kogut and Metiu 2001). That is, to maximize the gains from
the creation, reuse, and trade of one factor: knowledge (Garzarelli
et al. 2008). This “mindshare” approach has been referred to also as
“collective invention” (Osterloh and Rota 2004).
In more ways than one, then, voluntary OSS production can be
conceived of as another tangible illustration of the advantages that can
emerge from the spontaneous interaction of many individuals, each
possessing limited knowledge and pursuing their own interests (Hayek
1937, 1945; Jensen and Meckling 1992; Raymond 2001). In other words,
voluntary OSS production is a contemporary illustration that shows how
“the productivity of social cooperation surpasses in every respect the
sum total of the production of isolated individuals” (Mises 1960: 43).
But this poses the question of the origin of the emergent benefits of
voluntary OSS development. By considering production as a set of
interrelated tasks rather than as a mere technological relationship,3 we
offer a counterintuitive answer to this question, namely, that in the
main the emergent benefits of voluntary OSS production do not derive
from specialization but from division of labor. The division of labor of
voluntary OSS production is not ordered sequentially as specialization
would require, but rather in a parallel and overlapping form. And the
benefits from this parallel and overlapping division of labor, it is
suggested, trump those of specialization. This is so because in volun-
tary OSS production the learning by doing is primarily organizational
rather than individual.
To express our claim in other terms, voluntary OSS production is a
social learning process that gives off signals that reveal problems
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regarding production relationships and their inputs and outputs. The
need to correct problems acts as a mechanism that stimulates internal
urges, compelling individuals to seek out new problem-solving tech-
niques. These incentives that are awakened by problems ultimately
also increase productivity because they reveal production choices that
would otherwise remain unknown.4
Modularity and Two Divisions of Labor
Before exploring the rudimentary building blocks of the division of
labor of voluntary OSS production, it is useful to quickly do two
things. The first is to introduce the rules governing voluntary OSS
division of labor. Without at least a basic awareness of these rules it
is difficult to convey a sense of how a parallel and overlapping
process of production can work. The second is to shed some light on
the specific characteristics that define vertical and horizontal divisions
of labor, the two divisions of labor that Smith ([1776] 1981) obliquely
alludes to (Leijonhufvud 1986).5 As will be clear before long, in fact,
vertical and horizontal divisions of labor are two useful heuristic
expedients that will help us to more easily understand how voluntary
OSS production relates to more familiar structures of production.
Modularity Rules
Software production is an activity that is very knowledge intensive: it
embodies the knowledge of many programmers, each of whom only
knows a portion of what others know. As such, it manifests useful
give-and-take: software programming is a social learning process
(Baetjer 1998). But in order for the learning to be sufficiently coherent
with the overall aims of a software project, there must be some basic
rules in place that channel it in the right direction. This is especially
so in cases of voluntary OSS production where input is spontaneous.
Most voluntary OSS projects rely on the rules of modularity (Simon
[1962] 1998). As the name implies, modularity is about breaking up a
system into parts (modules) in the attempt to make it more manage-
able. By making a project more manageable through decomposition,
modularity assists the division of labor (Baldwin 2008). And to lever-
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age from divided labor, modular decomposition minimizes modular
interdependencies by hiding information. Instead of all knowledge
being communicated across modules, information hiding lets modules
keep some of their knowledge “secret” from the rest of the project. In
this fashion, no module can interfere with the data and functions of
other modules. Knowledge is thus encapsulated within modules, and
a programmer need not necessarily hold any information about the
other modules of the project with which his module interacts (Parnas
1972). More generally, information hiding is important because it
“allows developers to understand the system better by viewing it at a
high level of abstraction” (Baetjer 1998: 107).
However, given that separate modules form part of the same
system, communication among modules cannot be entirely blocked.
Or, more precisely, as long as we acknowledge that the system is
directed towards a goal, as is, for instance, the case of a software
project, the system cannot be completely decomposable, but only in
part. Modules need to know what their functions are as well as the
functions of complementary modules (the architecture of the system),
the nature of their relationships with their complementary modules
(the interface of the system), and their performance relative to other
modules (the standards of the system). Baldwin and Clark (2000) refer
to these modular properties as the visible design rules of a modular
system. Therefore, a modular system directed towards an end is one
that should be nearly decomposable, preserving the possibility of
cooperation among complementary modules by sharing and commu-
nicating visible design rules, while at the same time preserving the
hidden design parameters specific to each module (Langlois and
Garzarelli 2008).
The distinguishing mark of modularity is then the forcing, as it were,
of the use of specialization by relying on rules that blind irrelevant
information. In the case of voluntary OSS production this is also the
case. However, voluntary OSS entails that, in addition to being able to
spontaneously contribute to tasks that reflect one’s specialization, a
programmer is able to spontaneously contribute to tasks for which he
or she is non-specialized. Consider the following system-versus-
individual metaphor to more finely hone this observation. At the system
level, individuals are specialized in the sense of being programmers; but
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at the individual level, each programmer may not always contribute
according to his primary specialty.6 And it is because of the existence of
this imperfect matching that specialized effects turn out to be secondary
vis-à-vis divided ones in voluntary OSS production. In many ways, the
rest of this work can be interpreted as an attempt to elaborate this point,
that is, to begin to direct attention to the division of labor properties of
one type of modular organization.
Vertical and Horizontal Divisions of Labor
A vertical division of labor takes place when an individual performs
each of the tasks of a process of production of a particular good.
Consider, to illustrate, a carpenter who needs to produce a piece of
furniture. The carpenter’s tasks, to name a few, would include select-
ing the appropriate wood, cutting and gluing the wood to design,
treating the wood, and, often, even selling the furniture once com-
pleted. Figure 1 illustrates this vertical division of labor where different
individuals (A, B, C, D, E) perform every task (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) indepen-
dently. Thus, under vertical division of labor an individual boasts a
wide repertoire of skills, implying a lack of full specialization. That is
to say that vertically divided individuals are not committed to per-
forming solely one task according to an opportunity cost-minimizing
criterion, but rather perform a multiplicity of related tasks according to
both absolute and comparative advantages.
Figure 1
Vertical division of labor
A1  A2  A3  A4  A5 
B1 B2  B3   B4  B5 ⎯ Individual B working on  
the entire production sequence 
C1 C2  C3 C4  C5 
D1 D2 D3 D4  D5 
 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 
 
Time 
Source: Leijonhufvud (1986: 208).
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But from Smith ([1776] 1981) we also know that the division of labor
is constrained by the extent of the market. As the market for a
particular product expands, the tasks involved in its production
process can develop into specialized ones. When such a demand is
reached, an individual is able to dedicate himself solely to one task.
The result: horizontal division of labor, a situation typical of the factory
system, and later at the root of the modern corporation (Leijonhufvud
1986). As Georgescu-Roegen (1970: 8) phrases it, “the increased
specialization of labor could not have come about unless an increased
demand had already induced most craft shops to introduce the system
line. There can be little doubt about it: the factory system was born in
an artisan’s workshop, not in a factory.”
Under a horizontal division of labor, market demand is sufficient to
support an individual’s commitment to merely one task of a produc-
tion process. By implication, such an individual is able to become
more refined at that single task. But since there is no free lunch, such
specialization comes at the expense of a contracting repertoire of
skills. As Knight (1967: 21) vividly describes it, “it is especially signifi-
cant that the most important source of gain”—specialization—“also
involves the most important human cost,” that is to say, the narrowing
of one’s “personality.” Contrary to the vertical, then, the horizontal
division of labor implies that individuals are specialized. Figure 2
illustrates a horizontal division of labor in terms of our previous
Figure 2
Horizontal division of labor
A1  B2  C3  D4  E5 
  A1  B2  C3  D4  E5 
A1  B2  C3  D4  E5 
A1  B2  C3  D4  E5 
A1  B2  C3  D4  E5  
Etc.   …  
 
Time 
Source: Leijonhufvud (1986: 209).
Open Source Software Production 933
notation. We readily see how each individual performs only one task
of the sequence (A performs just task 1, B performs just task 2, etc.).7
Voluntary OSS Division of Labor: A Stylized Model
Open source guru Raymond (2001) reminds us that in voluntary OSS
production, as elsewhere, innovation and discovery often are a direct,
if unintentional, product of the satisfaction of desires. At times, there
may be a specific need that an individual wishes to satisfy (e.g.,
adapting a software package to a new printer). In these cases, the
individual is “intrinsically motivated,” that is, he freely sorts himself
into some task that he desires to perform. Intrinsic motivation usually
derives from work that is considered interesting, and can be “crowded
out” if an individual senses, for example, that he is being monitored
or supervised (Frey 1997). As Deci (1971: 105) originally put it, if
“external rewards are given for an intrinsically motivated activity,
[then] the person perceives that the locus of control or the knowledge
or feeling of personal causation shifts to an external source, leading
him to become ‘a pawn’ to the source of external rewards. Similarly,
. . . external rewards affect the person’s concept of why he is working
and his attitude toward the work.”
And yet, not all outside actions crowd out intrinsic motivation.
When an outside action is perceived to be a controlling one, such as
in the case of a principal-agent relationship where the principal takes
over some of the agent’s actions, we are most likely to see a drop in
intrinsic motivation. When an outside action instead is perceived as
informative, such as in the case of positive reinforcement to the agent
from the principal, we are most likely to see no drop in intrinsic
motivation or perhaps even a rise in it (Frey 1997: 432). As illustrated
below, in the case of voluntary OSS production, where, with few
exceptions, we may liken everyone to his own principal, an important
source of an outside action that is informative is learning from the
errors and contributions of others.
At the same time, however, the capacity to perform a self-selected
task to satisfy a specific need is also a function of the number of
task(s) accessible to the individual. When the tasks at an individual’s
disposal are limited, the ability to satisfy a need is hindered. Think
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about the quintessential firm where usually not everyone is working
on his or her preferred task in every point in time. In such types of
organization, the incentive to pursue the satisfaction of a particular
need is often abandoned. But when tasks are not limited the means of
reaching satisfaction are extended. When this is the case, the incentive
to pursue the satisfaction of a particular need increases. “The more
extensive the agents’ participation possibilities are, the higher is the
work morale” (Frey 1997: 431). Voluntary OSS organization presents
a potentially unlimited set of production tasks that one can freely
align to.
In voluntary OSS production individuals therefore have a high
intrinsic motivation because the tasks instrumental in satisfying their
specific needs, such as customizing a particular software program, are
open to them. As a matter of fact, in many cases they themselves
create the task in order to solve a particular puzzle that is bugging
them. Indeed, this is Raymond’s (2001: 23, emphasis removed) first
important lesson about voluntary OSS programming, namely, that
“[e]very good work of software starts by scratching a developer’s
personal itch.” As a result, there is a strong incentive behind these
voluntary contributions; and a strong incentive behind a contribution
means that there is greater scope for productive behavior. It is exactly
this pool of self-motivation, this congeries of “spontaneous incentives”
emerging from individual needs and desires, that voluntary OSS
production attempts to seize. Raymond (2001) actually expresses
surprise after discovering that there are tremendous productivity gains
accruing through such software “development style” and employs two
useful ideal types to analyze it: the cathedral (centralized) and the
bazaar (decentralized).
Just like the employees in the quintessential firm, the cathedral
mode of production proposes that individuals be assigned to tasks on
the basis of their competence. In this way, it is suggested, knowledge
can be directed to its most productive use. Consequently, a cathedral
approach gives rise to a centralized development structure reminiscent
of a horizontal division of labor. Proprietary software echoes this form
of economic organization: the development process is left to a limited
group of highly specialized programmers. However, Raymond (2001:
8) points to a significant shortcoming of this: in “a cathedral-builder
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view of programming, bugs and development problems are tricky,
insidious, deep phenomena. It takes months of scrutiny by a dictated
few to develop confidence that you’ve winkled them all out.” This is
why, to this day, proprietary software takes quite some time to release.
Conversely, the bazaar assumes that a limited set of consciously
organized individuals will never completely possess all the necessary
knowledge to always solve software production problems. As Hayek
(1945: 519) famously wrote, knowledge “of the circumstances of
which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated
form, but solely as dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently con-
tradictory knowledge which all separate individuals possess.” With
each individual only possessing limited and different knowledge, it
would seem impossible to assign tasks to a set of individuals in a
manner that knowledge always would be put to its most valued use.
Besides knowledge being dispersed and idiosyncratic, there is another
reason as to why this is so: the growth of knowledge. Knowledge is
about dynamic organization, that is, about changing interrelations
among qualitative patterns of stimuli that belong to, and can change,
a system. It is not about passive quantitative patterns of stimuli that
just serve a system without affecting it (Fransman 1994; Langlois and
Garrouste 1997): “that which we call knowledge is primarily a system
of rules of action assisted and modified by rules indicating equiva-
lences or differences of various combinations of stimuli” (Hayek 1978:
41). So how does one try to improve the allocation and use of
knowledge at every point in time when such knowledge is not
identical, not fully endowed to everyone and not constant? Advocates
of voluntary OSS place their chips on decentralization. And evidence
shows this bet to pay off (Giuri et al. 2010).
A bazaar organizational form attempts to leave all input options
open by leaving the production process open. The production process
is open in the sense that individuals are not necessarily assigned to,
and hence not necessarily restricted to, tasks based on their implied
specialization. Rather, the bazaar favors voluntary collaboration; it
promotes the spontaneous convergence of distributed knowledge.
Given a very large set of decision makers collaborating through the
exchange of knowledge, it is possible to identify and formulate a
wider array of problems and to find a larger set of alternative solu-
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tions. This is what Raymond (2001: 8) refers to as “Linus’s Law”: “given
enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow,” or, simply put, what one pair
of eyes might miss, there are countless other pairs that can make up
for it. In sum, the freedom to access, copy, and modify source code
is a way for voluntary OSS production to tap into a larger collective
intelligence that enables it to benefit from a broader problem-solving
ability.
But this begs the question of what kind of division of labor
voluntary OSS production engenders, namely, what are the division of
labor dynamics typical of the bazaar? As hinted, voluntary OSS devel-
opment leaves all input options (production tasks) open, which in
turn implies that programmers have the liberty to self-select into any
production task(s) they desire. In actual fact, this means that in such
a production setting individuals are not bound to tasks that corre-
spond to their primary specialization. The upshot is that in any point
in time it is possible for any number of individuals to be working on
single or multiple tasks irrespective of specialization.
Figure 3 is a stylized model that tries to capture the essence of such
voluntary OSS division of labor. It shows how task 1 is undertaken by
a number of individuals, for example, individuals A, F, and O, whom
also can be seen contributing towards other production tasks. Simi-
larly, task 3 is also undertaken by numerous individuals of whom
some (C, E, and G) are contributing towards multiple tasks.
At the same time, within a bazaar it is possible that certain produc-
tion tasks be exclusively reserved for and performed by selected
individuals. This is especially evident in the early stages of an open
source project when the process of production is not yet fully defined
(Murdock 2003; Langlois and Garzarelli 2008). But as a project evolves
and matures there are some tasks that are still in the exclusive domain
of a few individuals. One example of this is the project leader, who is
responsible for the coordination of production. Another example is
package maintainers and core groups of programmers who usually
have complete authority over their part of the project. This kind of
situation is illustrated by individual S in Figure 3 who only oversees a
specific set of components (represented by task 8) of the system by
supervising the highly specialized team composed of s1, s2, s3, and s4.
In another sense, the box within Figure 3 that encompasses s1, s2, s3,
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Figure 3
Voluntary OSS production
A1 A2 
B1 
C1  C3 ⎯ Individual C working on multiple inputs 
D1 
  E3  E5 
F1 F2  F4 
  G2 G3 
  H2 
  I2 
   J3 
   K3  K5 
   L3 
   M3 
    N4 
O1   O4 O5 
    P4 
  Q2  Q4 
     R5 
      
  
   
   
   .   .   . 
   .   .   . 
   .   .   . 
 …          …     …   X9 ⎯  
Individual X having exclusive rights on task 9, e.g., package maintenance
  .  .   . 
  .  .   . 
  .  .   . 
 …           …                   …  
 Etc. 
Parallel, overlapping inputs 
s1, s2, s3, s4 
S8 
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and s4 (under the guidance of S) depicts an instance of the cathedral
mode within voluntary production. That is, we have a rudimentary
depiction of conscious direction in a voluntary project.
Therefore, we have that certain programmers can be working solely
on one task (horizontal division of labor) while others can be working
on multiple tasks (similarly to the vertical division of labor8). But what
are the implications of this? The mixture of vertical and horizontal
divisions of labor in voluntary OSS organization implies that:
• any individual is able to self-select into a task that corresponds to
his or her primary expertise and is at the same time also able to
self-select into tasks that do not reflect the same match;
• any number of individuals possibly may be contributing to the
same task at any given point in time.
The first implication suggests that the voluntary nature of OSS
production yields a degree of imperfect matching of individual spe-
cialization to performed task. The second implication highlights the
possibility that, at any given moment, several individuals may be
working spontaneously on the same production task. Prima facie,
these two implications would lead us to classify voluntary OSS pro-
duction as inefficient under standard production accounts. However,
this is not necessarily the case once a more explicit focus is placed on
the learning dynamics innate in voluntary OSS production: more
knowledge is created when individuals can more freely interact with
each other.
Mistake-Ridden Learning Is Not Such a Mistake
When a programmer is faced with some specific need, the voluntary
nature of OSS production allows the programmer the ability to self-
select into tasks that ultimately service that need. But the correction of
disequilibria in voluntary OSS production, as hinted, does not neces-
sarily hinge on perfect matching between task and volunteer. As such,
one might regard such imperfect sorting as having little or no pro-
ductive value. There is nothing erroneous with this argument if one
reasons according to familiar productivity measures, such as increases
in productivity at lower unit costs. However, what matters are also
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overall increases in productivity tied to the growth of knowledge,
namely, deriving from the learning curve (Garzarelli et al. 2008). The
crux of the matter is that just as specialized contributions can be a
source of productivity so too can non-specialized ones: as elaborated
presently, voluntary OSS production promotes an environment that
facilitates learning from the mistakes of one another.
In traditional division of labor accounts, such as the Smithian ones
alluded to earlier, productivity gains from specialization originate from
a cognitive process of individual learning by doing that is a “by-
product” of production. For example, in horizontal division of labor,
repeating the same task and following the same routine means that
through increasing specialization an individual learns to simplify his
task. That is to say that productivity increases as a result of increased
experience in production (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1969). As such, spe-
cializing individuals develop the knowledge to source innovative
ways by which the production task may be altered so as to produce
more efficiently.
But in such cases there is negligible learning among persons
involved in the same production process: learning by doing is mostly
individual rather than organizational. In voluntary OSS production, we
saw, it is possible for many individuals to be working simultaneously
on the same task at any given point in time. In this case there is scope
for individuals involved in the same task to collaborate, to share their
production failures and successes. As a result, learning by doing
becomes social in that the collaborative network extends the bound-
aries of learning by doing beyond the individual level into the
organizational one. Knowledge growth materializes through planned
and unplanned organizational interactions that transmit and exchange
knowledge. Organizational interaction helps an individual improve
her problem-solving ability by exposing her to the unique “bits” of
knowledge held by other individuals.9 While the ability to work
independently leads to improvements in one’s skills.
Consider the following example. Suppose a problem is identified
and that the problem corresponds to a programming task that neither
programmer X nor Y are specialized in. If X and Y are motivated by
some personal need to solve the problem, both programmers will
choose to spontaneously contribute towards the task. Suppose also
940 The American Journal of Economics and Sociology
that programmer X is first to provide his modification of the source
code to the community of developers. If X’s modifications are flawed,
programmer Y will be able to identify where X went wrong, and thus
avoid replicating the same mistake. Taking the new knowledge learnt
from X’s mistakes, Y can find an alternative solution to the problem,
a solution that would have otherwise been unknown to Y had X’s
contribution not have been able to be effectively communicated. The
mistake of one individual serves to pollinate the ideas of another in a
manner that bears fruit to new, productive ideas. Each learning
opportunity extends the innate knowledge of participants to the
production process. This in turn expands the arsenal of knowledge
that can be used to scrutinize any given problem at any given point
in time. This example is admittedly crude; nonetheless it helps us to
more sharply focus the dynamics of mistake-ridden learning found in
voluntary OSS production. It is very likely that numerous individuals
provide spontaneous contributions and that numerous other individu-
als identify, and learn from, different mistakes. With potentially thou-
sands of individuals spontaneously contributing at any given moment,
the potential “cross-pollination” of ideas is vast.
The increase in learning experiences, in turn, favors an enhance-
ment of learning capabilities, that is, of that specific production
knowledge that is revealed in the reflexive process of adapting to
changing circumstances.10 In essence, by learning more, individuals
learn how to learn better—they improve their learning skills. This
“learning to learn” (Stiglitz 1987) involves improvements, firstly, in the
capability to absorb information, and, secondly, in the capability to
disseminate information, acknowledging mistakes and retaining best
practices. In keeping with this view, we would expect heterogeneity
in learning rates, that is, the open-ended sorting of individual to task
gives rise to slow and fast learners. And it is precisely this heteroge-
neity in learning rates that can be a vital source of knowledge gains.
“Organizations store knowledge in their procedures, norms, rules
and forms”—their “code.” “They accumulate such knowledge over
time, learning from their members. At the same time, individuals in an
organization are socialized to organizational beliefs.” Thus, a mutual
learning process exists whereby “the organizational code affects the
beliefs of individuals, even while it is being affected by those beliefs”
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(March 1991: 73, 75). According to such perspective, knowledge gains
transpire as a result of factors that create “variability” between orga-
nizational and individual beliefs. One way for achieving and sustain-
ing this variability is for an organization to maintain a heterogeneous
population of slow and fast learners. For “any average rate of learning
from the code, it is better from the point of view of equilibrium
knowledge to have that average reflect a mix of fast and slow learners
rather than a homogeneous population” (March 1991: 77). This equi-
librium entails that both the organization and a fraction of fast learn-
ing individuals are simultaneously able to learn from the “deviations”
(the errors) of slow learners.11 Consequently, being characterized by
both specialized and non-specialized inputs, we would expect vol-
untary OSS to benefit from a mixture in learning rates in the same
manner.12
Moreover, March continues, like the heterogeneity in learning rates,
diversity among individuals’ knowledge levels improves aggregate
knowledge. The “old-timers” of an organization know more than the
“new blood” of an organization. However, what they know is “redun-
dant” with knowledge that is already possessed and reflected by the
organization. As a result, old-timers are less likely to contribute new
knowledge. The new blood introduced into the organization may be
less knowledgeable than their existing counterparts, but their knowl-
edge is less redundant with the existing state of organizational knowl-
edge. Therefore, the entry of new individuals into an organization is
more likely to contribute to new knowledge gains as long as col-
laboration continues to expose mistakes. One would imagine this to
be particularly the case in voluntary OSS production where modu-
larity renders the exit and entry of old-timers and new blood rela-
tively free.
The knowledge production from the open interaction of different
knowledge stocks and flows moreover resonates with the main nor-
mative insight about modularity, namely, its superior resiliency to
change (Simon [1962] 1998; Frenken et al. 1999). The ability of a
modular system to continue working even if not all its parts are on the
same page (pursuing an objective even if one module is malfunction-
ing, simultaneously trying to solve different problems, working at
different rates, etc.) is what gives a modular system its edge.
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Take software bugs, that is, those programming errors that could
render the functioning of a software system less reliable. In the case
of proprietary software, we saw, bug solving can seriously threaten
the success of a project. This is so because given the unitary nature of
the cathedral mode of production, a bug may halt the whole project
for there may be a substantial lag between a bug’s solution and the
latter’s adoption within the project. But this is not the case, as we also
saw, for the bazaar. A bazaar can limp along even while several bugs
are trying to be fixed. There is no need for all bugs to be necessarily
fixed in order for the system to continue working because, unlike the
cathedral, information hiding allows the bazaar to work with a lower
number of required communications among all parts of the system.
The voluntary division of labor of the bazaar in fact generates a
distributed intelligence that is also, to some extent, parallel. That is to
say that we have an organization where there is an uncommon level
of redundancy as well as of uniqueness of knowledge content. It is the
amalgamation of the redundancy and uniqueness—or, if you prefer, of
non-specialized and specialized labor—from modularity that aids the
speed of adaptation (bug fixing).13
In general, however, it would be imprecise to assume that
adaptation—the creation and discovery of new knowledge—rests
merely on a parallel and distributed intelligence. Here (as elsewhere)
new knowledge can also be generated in isolation by mere thinking.
“Any kind of experience—accidental impressions, observations, and
even ‘inner experience’ not induced by stimuli received from the
environment—may initiate cognitive processes leading to changes in
a person’s knowledge. Thus, new knowledge can be acquired without
new information being received” (Machlup 1983: 644, emphasis
removed).
But in these cases too it is the modular nature of voluntary OSS
organization that plays a crucial role. Information hiding encourages
individual abstract thinking: a volunteer can maintain congruency with
the common goal of the project by working on a particular task that
interests her because she knows that while she is at work there will
not be external disturbances. Similarly to property rights in social
systems, in fact, information hiding defines sheltered domains where
individuals can focus their cognitive attention not having to worry
Open Source Software Production 943
about possible “violations” of property. The sheltering allows planning
and acting notwithstanding the Hayekian knowledge problem, assist-
ing divided labor (Miller and Drexler 1988).
However, with few exceptions mostly concerning novel knowledge
simultaneously affecting several existing modules and their interrela-
tions where we would see, for example, the coordination of the
project leader, it is in the main the visible design rules that filter the
value of the novel knowledge from individual thinking to the orga-
nization. Recall in fact that knowledge itself is a system of rules of
action for a system that can also change a system. Hence, analogously
to the case of organizationally-generated knowledge, it is the visible
design rules—the already-accepted organizational knowledge—that
most often coordinate the new knowledge that is individually gener-
ated. The visible design rules per se are a source of redundancy in that
they are the minimum common denominator ordering the individual
and organizational knowledge interactions, and that, additionally,
allow knowledge to be re-used and shared across the system. In short,
visible design rules cement a modular system while simultaneously
being sufficiently plastic to allow changes in the system itself in the
face of evolutionary necessity.
Let us point out before wrapping up that we are not suggesting that
OSS holds a monopoly on voluntary production. One of the most
obvious comparable organizational modes is arguably the production
of science.14 Scientific communities have organized themselves in a
similar voluntary fashion at least since the late 16th century when
inquiry replaced secrecy, social cooperation replaced individual iso-
lation, and spontaneous coordination replaced top-down planned
design and control (David 2004). In addition, in most cases we decide
what topics we fancy working on, and the decisions made need not
be particularly founded on a “best fit” for those topics as opposed to
an interest in them. Similarly, we form research teams spontaneously
for different projects, and we participate in networks and belong to
“invisible colleges” according to shared research topics and fields. To
ensure the fit of what we do within the broader literature, we must
possess, and need to convey, a sense of the broader structure of the
scientific research program (note the word, program) within which we
are operating. In this regard, new PhDs (the new blood) are often less
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clear about the broader architecture of their discipline than the more
experienced researchers (the old-timers). And just as open source
development communities examine the robustness of submitted code,
so too do peers of academia when refereeing papers submitted to
journals and conferences. In both organizational modes, knowledge is
shared, suggestions for improvement made, learning opportunities
among colleagues created, and contributions are more about sponta-
neously supplying effort to a big project rather than about making a
product according to some predefined blueprint.15
Conclusion
This article analyzes the modular organization of voluntary OSS pro-
duction by considering the relationship between the imperfect match-
ing of a programmer’s specialization to a performed task and
productivity. It proposes that productivity gains may also be realized
through non-specialized inputs: imperfect matching is offset by a
parallel and overlapping division of labor that aids learning from each
other’s mistakes and contributions. As long as volunteers can freely
exchange the knowledge that they come across, generate, and inter-
pret, organizational knowledge can only ever grow.
Voluntary production renders it relatively easy for individuals to
take up a set of tasks out of a sheer need to do so; however, it renders
it equally relatively easy for them to abandon a set of tasks in the
pursuit of another set. As a result, there may be a situation in which
volunteers do not bring to completion their initial tasks. Therefore,
voluntary production may not always be able to optimally capitalize
on spontaneous contributions; and such inconsistency of efforts may
also mean that development speed is not always as rapid as we would
like to believe.
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Notes
1. See, for example, the regularly-updated statistics freely available on
Netcraft: http://news.netcraft.com/.
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2. One reference for all: the MIT website that collects OSS papers,
http://opensource.mit.edu/.
3. On which see, for example, Georgescu-Roegen (1970), Winter (2005),
and Dosi and Grazzi (2006).
4. Compare Rosenberg (1969).
5. In a recent contribution, Leijonhufvud (2007) returns to these themes,
but for some reason inverts his original classification, calling the horizontal
division of labor vertical and, by difference, implying that the vertical division
of labor is the horizontal. Here, we will stick to the original 1986 definitions.
6. We may even make the metaphor slightly more precise. If we define,
following Ames and Rosenberg (1965), specialization as the reciprocal of skill,
we have the ratio of the number of doers (individuals) per activity (task). We
can accordingly define a specialization index that lies between 0 (complete
non-specialization) and 1 (complete specialization). So, in terms of this index,
in voluntary OSS production it is not uncommon in any point in time to have
several individuals whose specialization index is significantly below 1 in at
least one task performed while having an overall index of 1 in the primary
activity, namely, programming.
7. Compare Houthakker (1956) for a more complete cost-benefit analysis
of specialization.
8. “Similarly” yet not identically to the vertical division of labor because
work—input-output relations—may be not necessarily linearly sequential, but
rather roundabout.
9. Compare Marshall (1961: 271) on social learning: “if one man starts a
new idea it is taken up by others and combined with suggestions of their own;
and thus it becomes the source of further new ideas.”
10. On the general theoretical notion of capabilities in the context of
organizational analysis, see, for example, Garzarelli (2008).
11. Equilibrium is established when all individuals and the organizational
code share the same belief with respect to each dimension of reality. Thus,
equilibrium entails the convergence of beliefs and the end of any variability.
12. See David and Rullani (2008) for an empirical study germane to this
claim; we came across this intriguing study only after the first draft of this
article was already completed.
13. Organizational parallels with multi-level minds that are also modular
have a long history in economics; see, for example, Marshall ([1867–1888]
1994), which seems to have had a profound influence on his subsequent
theory of organization (Marshall [1867–1868] 1994).
14. We are grateful to an anonymous referee who suggested that we
make this parallel more explicit. Compare also the earlier Garzarelli et al.
(2008) and Langlois and Garzarelli (2008) that hint to the production par-
allel with science as well as to others (e.g., voluntary production for hob-
byist ends).
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15. Two observations can be made. First, from casual empiricism, one
could argue that it is more common for social scientists than for natural
scientists to work in the bazaar mode. Second, voluntary production may not
be safe from opportunism either (Williamson 1985). A referee has an incentive
to hold back on some things that she could see that she could develop in her
own work, thereby allowing a paper to get published without some exten-
sions being noted or “bugs” fixed. In proprietary software firms, it is possible
for an employee to make herself indispensable by limiting how much she
documents what she does in an opportunistic manner, so that if she were to
be fired it would take substantial investment for the organization to acquire
the knowledge she had been using. We arguably get less potential for
opportunism in voluntary OSS projects, though it is easy to imagine that if an
OSS volunteer also has a “day job” in which he uses similar capabilities, he
may wish to limit how much he shares with others who are working on the
same module and have day jobs with other companies who may be rivals.
Note here that opportunism does not derive from physical asset specificity or
other financial commitments that may be hard to liquidate or re-use else-
where. Since exit in voluntary organization is easy, the wasted resource would
merely be time, though this time investment may be more than offset by the
learning that takes place while involved in the voluntary project. This second
observation also brings to mind Richardson’s (1960) concern with what he
saw as the “problem” of coordinating market entry decisions when entry
barriers are low. In voluntary production, having “too many” programmers
working on a particular module or research project prima facie doesn’t seem
a particularly big problem because of ease of exit. Be that as it may, both
observations require further scrutiny.
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